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Civil No. 8276 
IN THE SUPREME. CO·URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J·E.ANNE; ALE·X,INE .JENKINS, 
P~amtiff and Respovrldent,. 
-vs.-
·JOHN ALLEN JE,NKINS and 
VERONIC'A JENKINS·, 
Defe~dfJll'l).ts arnd Appellants. 
BRIE:F OF AP·PELLAN'T·s JOHN ALLEN JENKIN'S 
and VER.ONICA JENKINS; 
Appeal from the District c:ourt of the Third Judicial 
District in and for the County of Salt Lake 
HoNORABLE LEWis JONEs, Judge 
GUS·TIN, RICHARD1S & MATIT1S1S·O·N 
and FRED H. E·V ANS 
At:torneys for Defend01nts aJnd 
A p1pellamts 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNE ALEXINE JENKIN·S, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
JOHN ALLEN JENKINS and 
\TERONICA JENKINS, 
Defendants arnd Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 8276 
This is an appeal from an order granting a "\vrit of 
habeas corpus and giving custody of Theodore Scott 
Jenkins, age 7, and Mia Jenkins, age 4, to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff is the mother and the defendant John Allen 
Jenkins is the father of the two children. \T eronica 
Jenkins, the present wife of John, is only a nominal party. 
Any further reference to the appellants, unless otherwise 
expressly indicated, will be to the defendant John Allen 
Jenkins. 
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STATE,MENT O·F FA·CTS 
The record is silent as to the marital background 
of the plaintiff and defendant. This chapter in the lives 
of the resp·ective parties involves the question as to what 
is for the best interests of their two children presently 
within the State of Utah and in the custody of the father. 
On May 6, 1954 there was issued a writ of habeas corpus 
(Tr. 7) pursuant to plaintiff's complaint ('Tr. 1-6) requir-
ing that the. children be p-roduced before the court to be 
dealt with according to law. The complaint pleads an in-
terlocutory judgment of divorce dated March· 9, 19'53 by 
the California court awarding the divorce and custody 
of the children to plaintiff, except that the defendant has 
the right of custody during one calendar month of the 
year ('Tr. 4). The final decree under California law was 
entered on March 9, 1954 at the instance of defendant con-
firming the provisions of the interlocutory de-cree (Tr. 
6). 
By paragraph 5· of the complaint (Tr. 2) plaintiff 
alleges: 
"That in accordance with the terms of said 
interlocutory decree and by reason of the illness 
of the plaintiff at the time, the defenwa~t, John 
Allen J·enkins, on or about the 5th day of May, 
19:53 W'as given cus·tody of sa,id min.or child.ren 
by the p·laintiff, it being the intention of the par-
ties at that time that such custody by the defend-
ant, John Allen Jenkins, would be temporary and 
that up·on the re-covery of plaintiff from her illness 
defendant would return said children to her." 
(Emphasis added) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
Defendant by his ans-vver (Tr. 10) alleges that on 
~fay 5, 19'53 the children, at the instance and request of 
plaintiff, were given to him to care for and have been 
cared for by hin1 since said time; that at the time the 
children were given in his custody plaintiff was ill, emo-
tionally upset and unable to properly care for the chil-
dren, and plaintiff has been under the care of doctors 
at different periods during the -vvhole of said time; that 
there was no agree1nent or understanding between plain-
tiff and the defendant that the children would be returned 
to plaintiff at any particular time or at all. There is 
the further allegation by way of answer that at the 
present tin1e plaintiff is emotionally unstable and not in 
a proper physical or 1nental condition to care for the 
children; that it would be for the best interests and wel-
fare of the children that they remain in the custody of 
their father, who is a fit and proper person to care for 
the children and who has a suitable home for their needs, 
protection and care. 
The trial court found (Tr. 50) that the plaintiff and 
the defendants are equally fit and proper persons to have 
the care, custody and control of the children and that the 
home of each of them is a proper environment in which 
to raise the children. There was no finding as to what 
might be to the best interests of the children, except that 
it is specifically found (Tr. 50) that the minor child, The-
odore Scott Jenkins, is presently enrolled at the Uintah 
School (Salt Lake City) in the first grade thereof and 
should re1nain in school until such time as the plaintiff 
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"is entitled to return to California as provided in the 
order of the court to be hereafter made.'' The order re-
ferred to ( Tr. 52) provides that the plaintiff shall not 
remove the children from the State of Utah until the tilne 
specified in the order and not then if the Supreme Court 
of the State uf Utah or any Justice thereof orders other-
wise. Prior to the time indicated a Justice of this Court 
ordered that the children be forthwith placed with and 
remain in the custody of the defendant during the de-
termination of this appeal and that neither the plaintiff 
nor the defendants shall remove or permit the removal 
of the children from the State of Utah during the pen-
dency of this appHal. 
The stay thus granted was consistent with counsel's 
statement at the trial to the effect that the plaintiff would 
not enter into a stipulation of any nature that the chil-
dren remain here, and that she was employed "do\vn 
there" (California) and could not reside ten1porarily 
in the State of Utah and keep the boy in school in this 
State during the app~eal (Tr. 68). Counsel further indi-
cated that he had prepared an order granting plaintiff 
the i1nmediate return of the children and allowing her to 
take them to California ('Tr. 73). This the trial court 
resolved by saying (Tr. 80): 
"In other words, if somebody grants a stay, 
then she'll either have to stay here and take care 
of the children, or else she'll have to let the father 
take then1 back out there pending the appeal." 
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vVhen the action vvas called for trial in Jlune 1954 the 
trial court invited a statement of the parties in the nature 
of a pretrial. 
"I think I'll require a statement of the theory 
of the parties, in the nature of a pretrial, before 
we commence, because this may or may not be 
able to be settled. I don't mean ultimately settled, 
but the matter of why the parties are here rather 
than down in the Superior Court of San Diego 
County is a very pressing thing to the court. Irre-
gardless of Cook v. Cook and other cases, I'd like 
to discuss the lavv before we take any evidence. 
I don't mean by that that we can settle the matter, 
but we might hurdle something." (T'r. 21) 
Pages 21 through 45 of the record on appeal disclose 
\vhat is termed by the minute entry of June 22, 1954 (Tr. 
16) as "pretrial statements" and "oral stipulation" of 
counsel, the minute entry indicating that upon such oral 
stipulation and pretrial statements the hearing was con-
tinued without date pending the filing by the defendants 
vvithin ten days of a petition to modify the decree of di-
vorce in the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cali-
fornia, the defendant agreeing to submit himself to such 
jurisdiction. The 1ninute entry concludes: 
"The Court further retains the temporary 
custody of the two minor children, pending an or-
der issuing from the Superior Court of San 
Diego, California awarding the custody of the chil-
dren to either party, at which time this Court will 
order the custody of the children in whomever 
the Superior Court of San Diego, California di-
rects." 
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At the June hearing no inquiry "~as made as to what 
might be for the best interests of the children nor were 
any witnesses examined. Among the staten1ents in the 
nature of pretrial at the June hearing were the follow'-
Ing: 
Plaintiff contends that she has recovered from the 
illness alleged in her complaint (Tr. 26) ; plaintiff is a 
resident of ·san Fira.ncisco, California (Tr. 28); defendant 
was ready to show that on the 5th day of May, 1953, plain-
tiff suffered an accident, she fell two stories from the roof 
of a building, she didn't know what she was doing on the 
roof, she doesn't know whether she jump.ed or whether 
she fell but, nevertheless, she stayed in the hospital a 
number of weeks with a broken back; just prior to that 
time she was in a hospital under psychiatric observation, 
it being defendant's contention that plaintiff was pre-
maturely released from the hospital; the matters pro-
posed to he shown by defendant have develop·ed since the 
C'alifornia interlocutory decree of divorce, were latent 
at the time of that decree and never came to the attention 
of the California court, and it is defendant's theory that 
in this kind of a proceeding those matters can be shown 
in the determination of what is to the best interests of 
the children (T·r. 34); the defendant is a Lieutenant in the 
Navy (Tr. 41), a part time instructor at the University 
and lives in S.alt Lake City with his present wife, likewise 
the place of residence of the defendant's mother (Tr. 
42). 
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In the course of the June proceedings, and to adapt 
the situation to previous expressions of this Court, con-
siderable was said about preserving the status quo in the 
event of an appeal, even though the proceedings were in 
the nature of habeas corpus ('Tr. 30-36). 
"THE COUR.T: Then to see if I can summarize 
this, the parties appear and make a pretrial state-
ment and stipulate the matter may be continued, 
the court to retain jurisdiction of the children un-
til such time as an order is obtained by either 
party. That is, a new order from the Superior 
Court of San Diego. That order could be either 
an order denying a petition to modify or granting 
a petition. And at that time, upon being advised 
of the action of the Superior Court of San Diego 
County, this court will then make its written order 
directing - or granting the writ if you prevail 
down in San Diego, and denying the writ if you 
prevail, Mr. Gustin. Is that ·the understanding 
now, so that the parties won't have to come back~ 
~IR. INGEBRETSEN: And do I understand 
there will be no appeal from that~ 
THE COURT: Oh, down there, I don't knovv 
anything about that. 
MR.. INGEBRETSEN: I presume that order 
will be an appealable order-
THE COURT: Oh, it will be, but you're in effect 
agreeing to submit yourselves to California. All 
this court is doing is holding the children tempo-
rarily and abiding the decision down there. Cer-
tainly there would be the right of an appeal. (Tr. 
44) 
* * * 
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MR. INGEBRETSEN: I didn't 'vant to be plaeed 
in a position of not going through the trial and 
hearing and having an adjudication down there 
and having the court award the custody to the 
In other-
THE COURT: ·Once an order is made down there 
MR. INGEBRET'SEN: I wanted that under-
standing. 
MR. GUSTIN: That would be the final order. 
Any final order. 
THE COURT: Yes, that's a final order. Of 
course, there's a right to an appeal down there. 
MR. INGEBRETSEN: Yes. 
THE CO·URT : Yes. And technically there's a 
righ.t to an appeal here, but I don't imagine you'd 
get very far if you try to appeal here, because I'll 
retain the temporary custody of the children." 
(Tr. 45) 
A further hearing was had in the instant cause on 
October 14, 19·54 (Tr. 57-85), at which time it was shown 
that the California court made its findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and order (Ex. 4), all to the effect that 
defendant's application for modification was denied and 
he was ordered to immediately deliver the children to 
the plaintiff at her hon1e in ·san Francisco. The defend-
ant, by Exhibit 1 and by Exhibits 2 and 3, showed that he 
had appealed to the 'Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
fornia from the trial court's order. .After evidence of the 
California p-roceedings and the statements of counsel 
the court entered the order appealed from. 
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Preliminary to evidence of the status of the Cali-
fornia proceedings, defendant by his counsel called at-
tention to the stipulations entered into in the June pro-
ceedings (Tr. 58) and stated in effect that an appeal hav-
ing subsequently been taken to the Supreme Court of 
California the question is whether such an appeal comes 
within the purview of the stipulation in the sense that, 
pending that appeal, this matter remain in status quo 
and the children remain within the jurisdiction of the 
district court in and for Salt Lake County (Tr. 59). 
To avoid any distortion of the so-called stipulation 
we invite attention to all of the expressions of the trial 
court and counsel at both the June and October hearings. 
'Ve believe, however, that our theory of the premise upon 
'vhich the order in the instant case was entered is pointed 
out by the following: 
"MR .. GUSTIN: Now I'm wondering if there is any 
dispute, Mr. Ingebretsen, any question in your 
mi.nd or the mind of your client but what it would 
not be detrimental to these children so far as their 
environment is concerned~ I'm speaking of the 
family and the people that they're living with, to 
have them remain here during the pendency of the 
appeal in California. 
I'm ready to put on evidence as to that if counsel 
requires it. (Tr. 67) 
* * * 
MR. GUSTIN: I think school opened the first 
part of September. Now, the children are adjusted 
to this situation. They've been here for practically 
a year and a half. The environment is wholesoine. 
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I don't think counsel will question that. 
THE COURT: Well, all I'm trying to do is to 
respect and recogniz·e your theory of the case 
and let you get in the record what you want in, 
and, if we can, avoid taking testimony. Are you 
prepared to stipulate the boy is in the first grade 
in school~ 
MR. INGEBR.E·TSEN: I'll stipulate that. 
THE COURT·: And the children, considering 
their ages, and so on, are adjusted where they're 
staying. They know where the gate is and the 
sidewalk, and I guess they know some neighbor 
kids. That would follow as a matter of course 
with most children. 
MR. IN,GEBR.ETSEN: I think so. 
THE CO·URT: Tha;t saves putting on testimony 
in that regard. Is there anything else you would 
offe-r to provef 
MR. GUST'IN: I would ask counsel if he would 
agree with me that th·e children are in a whole-
some, compatible environment at the· moment, with 
Lieutenant Jenkins and his wife and Lieutenant 
Jenkin's mother. 
MR. INGEBRETSEN: I have no evidence to the 
contrary of that. (Tr. 73-74) 
* * * 
MR. GUSTIN: * * * Now, the only thing I'n1 
contending for is the California rule: 'A per-
fected app·eal in an action for the custody of a 
child automatically constitutes a stay of proceed-
ings and p-recludes a trial court from interfering 
with custody a.s existed at the time of the appeal.' 
And I'm trying to fit this proceeding into that 
situation. 
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THE COUR.T: All right. No\v have \Ve taken care 
of the record~ 
~IR. GUSTIN: So far as I'rn concerned. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, in order to 
shorten it up, let me ask you this question: Why 
shouldn't the court grant the writ forthwith on the· 
condition that the children rernain here with their 
mother a number of days in order to take care of 
sornething that I'rn reluctant to foreclose, even 
though I've said other\vise, and that's an appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Utah, and a stay by 
somebody up there~ ( Tr. 75) 
* * * 
l\1R. GUSTIN: I think your Honor has the power 
to stay this matter at this stage of the proceed-
ings. I personally would find it quite embarrass-
ing to go to the ·suprerne Court of the State of 
Utah in view of the stipulation that I made with 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't want to foreclose 
you from that opportunity, * * *. 
* * * I'rn willing to go back slightly on what I've 
indicated in order to give you the chance to go up 
to the Capitol and ask for that stay." (Tr. 76-77) 
By Exhibit 4 it will appear that the California trial 
court on September 22, 1954, rnade a finding that it is for 
the best interests of the minor children that they be in 
the care, custody and control of their natural mother, 
the plaintiff. But there is no such finding of the trial 
court in the instant case. rr.,he findings, conclusions and 
order appealed fron1 are silent as to what is for the best 
interests of the minor children in the premises. 
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S·TATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT EXERCISING ITS 
PLENARY POWER TO MAINTAIN THE ACTION IN STA-
TUS QUO AT LEAST UN'TIL THE CALIFORNIA APPEAL 
HAS BEEN DETERMINED. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO WHAT IS 
FOR THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE CALIFORNIA PROCEEDINGS. 
POINT III. 
THERE BEING NO FINDING AS TO WHAT IS FOR 
THE BEST IN'TERESTS OF THE MINOR CHILDREN, THE 
ORDER GRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS ·CORPUS IS 
CONTRARY TO LAW. 
AR,GUMENT 
The foregoing points can be properly argued upon 
the n1ain prernise tha.t the best interest and welfare of 
the children is the con trolling factor and is the rule 
adopted by this Court in child custody cases when not 
controlled by statute. The rule applies in both habeas 
corpus proceedings in the district court and proceedings 
in the juvenile court. Briggs z:. Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 
P. 2d 223. Has the rule been applied and followed in 
the instant case? 
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1. If the California proceedings are at all signifi-
cant the court acted prematttt.rely in gra.nting the writ of 
habeas corpus . 
.. A._t the outset of the hearing in June the court in-
vited discussion as to why the parties \vere not litigating 
the question of custody in the California court (Tr. 21). 
The rnatters that followed resulted in the hearing being 
continued without date pending the filing by the defend-
ant of a petition to modify in the Superior Court of San 
Diego County, California, the court retaining the tempo-
rary custody of the children pending an order from that 
court. The order of the California court, adverse to the 
defendant, \Yas prornptly appealed and the appeal was 
pending at the time of the October hearing herein. Cer-
tainly it \vould have been to the best interests and welfare 
of the children under the circurns tances, as shown by the 
record in this case, to await the outcome of the California 
appeal if the California proceedings were to have any 
effect, persuasively or other\vise, upon the decision of the 
court. The children are in a wholesorne, cornpatible en-
vironrnent with the defendant and his \Yife .. \Vhy shuttle 
the children back and forth between the States of Utah 
and California, which would be the case theoretically at 
least, if the decision being appealed frorn in the latter 
State is reversed. 
In the case of Ex parte Barr, 243 P. 2d 787, the Su-
prerne Court of California quotes the California rule as 
follows: 
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" ' (A) perfected appeal in an action for the 
custody of a child automatically constitutes a stay 
of proceedings and precludes a trial court from 
interfering with custody as it existed at the tin1e 
of appeal.' " 
The Court then goes on to state: 
"Otherwise, litigants would be encouraged 
to seize possession of the child pending appeal 
in the hope that in subsequent habeas corpus pro-
ceedings they could persuade an appellate court 
that their action was in the best interests of the 
child and that it should ratify their conduct by 
refusing to issue the writ. As colorfully pointed 
out in In re Browning, supra, 108 Cal. App. 503, 
507, 291 P. 650, 651, the child would be 'in the cate-
gory of a human football whose possession by 
either parent depends upon the agility, activity, 
and determination of each.' " 
It is to beg the question to sa.y that the trial court, 
by its conditional order, permitted this Court or one of 
the Justices thereof to issue a stay and thus preserve the 
status quo. The district courts of this state are courts 
having plenary power beyond that, except in matters of 
original jurisdiction, of the Supreme Court itself. It 'vas 
the duty of the district court to resolve the issue and if 
it was going to be controlled by the proceedings in the 
California court then its duty was to "\vithhold its judg-
ment until the proceedings in that court became final. 
When the court acted in the instant case there "\Yas no 
"final" judgment of the California court upon the peti-
tion for modification initiated pursuant to the stipulation 
by the defendant. 
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0 The best interest issue should hnve been deter-
}JZ.inecl irrespective of the California proceedin.qs. 
The father vvas given the custody of the children 
hy the 1nother on l\iay 5, 1953, "'in accordance \vith the 
tern1s of said interlocutory decree an:cl by reason of the 
illness of the plaintiff at the ti1ne" ( Con1plaint Tr. 2). 
The plaintiff pleads the fact of her illness by her com-
plaint herein. She alleges that she has recovered from 
such illness but who is to deter1nine that fact with the 
children rightfully in the custody of the father and within 
the jurisdiction of this court~ If the illness of the mother 
\Vas reason enough for her to turn the children over to the 
father it must certainly follow that there \vas a recogni-
tion on her part of being unable to properly care for and 
attend them. Who is to be the final arbiter of when the 
condition ceased which prompted the giving of custody 
of the children to the father and where is the authority 
to determine 1natters of custody of 1ninor children found 
'vi thin the borders of this State? Obviously the answer 
is the district court of our State and in some instances 
the juvenile court. The plaintiff by her petition or com-
plaint for the writ of habeas corpus initiated proceedings 
in our district court, a court of general jurisdiction, and 
once that \Vas done the court could not delegate its au-
thority to a foreign jurisdiction. 
In the Briggs case, supra, a prior decree of the State 
of Texas was involved. The decree a\varded the custody 
of the child to the 1nother and, \Vhile this court affirmed 
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the judg1nent of the District Court of lTtah County 
awarding the child to the n1other on habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, it, nevertheless, concluded, independently of the 
Texas decree, that in vie\v of all of the facts and circuin-
stances presented it \Yas not convinced that the best inter-
ests of the child required that the 1nother be deprived of 
such custody. 
In Sa.m.psell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550, a 
Nevada decree \Vas n1odified by the court below. It was 
held that the trial court erred in phrasing its decree in 
such fashion as to a1nend, or purporting to amend, the 
Nevada decree, but held the error to be forma1 only and 
then proceeded to correct the same without reversing the 
result or requiring a ne'v trial. As to the contention that 
full faith and credit was required to be given to the Ne-
vada decree this Court said: 
"By the 'veight of authority it is now well 
established 'that in th·e absence of fraud, or \Vant 
of jurisdiction, affecting its validity, a decree of 
divorce awarding the custody of a child of the 
marriage 1nust be given full force and effect in 
other states as to the right to the custody of the 
child at the time and under the circumstances of 
its rendition; but that such a decree has no con-
trolling effect in another state as to facts and con-
dition arising subsequently to the date of the de-
cree; and the courts of the latter state may, in 
proper proceedings award the custody otherwise 
upon proof of matters subsequent to the decree 
\vhich justify the change in the interest of the 
child.' (Italics added) 20 A.L.R. 815. The rule 
thus stated has been followed in this state. Cooke 
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v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 2-!8 P. 83; 72 ~~.L.R-. 444 
note. Later cases on this sa1ne point are collected 
in Goldsmith v. ·salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W. 2d 
165, 116 A.L.R. 1209 and ~Icl\1illin v. Mc~~Iillin, 114 
Colo. 2-1-7, 158 P. 2d 4-t-4, 160 A.L.R. 400." 
The plaintiff herself pleads a substantial change of 
circu1nstances following the entry of the California inter-
locutory decree. She pleads that she recognized her 
illness as being sufficient cause for her to voluntarily 
surrender custody of the children to the defendant. The 
effect of such change of condition as affecting the best 
interests of the children 1nust be decided by the courts 
of this State so long as the children rernain in this State 
and the jurisdiction of such court is invoked. Neither the 
parties nor the trial court can solve the proble1n by any 
half way 1neasure. It would invite the utn1ost confusion 
and conflict of la\vs to have the court of one sovereign 
~tate retaining the physical custody of the ·children and 
agreeing in advance to abide the outco1ne of a proceeding 
in another jurisdiction, particularly vvhen the other 
jurisdiction does no:t have the rhildren before it. 
3. The order grarnting custody to l;lain.tiff is not 
sup ported' by the fi.ndings. 
The court made no finding in connection \vith its 
order of ·October 1-1-, 1954, the order appealed from, as 
to the best interests of the children in the pre1nises. In 
the Briggs case, supra, it is stated: 
"Under that construction the n1other \vould be 
an in1proper person to have the enstody of this 
child if the welfare and best interest of the child 
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required that it be reared by its father, and the 
determining factor would be what, under the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances, would be for 
the best interest and welfare of the child. That is 
the rule which we have adopted in child custody 
cases not covered by this statute. This is true 
both in habeas corpus proceedings in the district 
court and proceedings in the juvenile court. W al-
ton v. Coffman, Utah, 169 P. 2d 97; Baldwin v. 
Nielson, Utah, 170 P. 2d 179, on rehearing 174 P. 
2d 437; In re Bradley, Utah, 167 P. 2d 978; In re 
Olson, Utah, 180 P. 2d 210. In the recent case of 
Anderson v. Anderson, Utah, 172 P. 2d 132, al-
though \Ve did not directly refer to or discuss this 
statute, or the meaning of this term, "\Ve applied 
this rule and took a child from the mother and 
gave it to its father because we were convinced 
that the best interest and welfare of the child re-
quires such a change. The facts in that case 
brought it within the provisions of this section 
but vve took this one child fron1 her notwithstand-
ing the fact that "\Ye approved a finding that she 
was a fit person to have the custody of her chil-
dren and allowed her to retain the custody of 
other children of the parties." 
In Snzith v. Snz ith, 1 lTtah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 283, this 
Court said: 
''The deter1nining issue here is \vhat will be 
for th.e· best interest of the child. This is an ulti-
mate question of fact \vhich the trial court found 
in the mother's favor. Child custody cases are 
equitable in nature and so we must review both 
the la\v and the facts. Here we have a double 
problen1 of determining not only the occurrences 
and events here involved but the much n1ore un-
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certain and controversial pro ble1n of trying to 
look into the future and see the effect on the hap-
piness and well-being of the child each course 
\Vill bring, and thus detern1ine which course will 
be for the best interest of the child." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant did not invite this appeal. He asked the 
trial court to pern1it hi1n to keep the children, who have 
been vvith him since May 1953, until the 1natter is "final-
ly" determined by the California court and suggested 
that the trial court exercise that power (Tr. 76). If that 
had been done then, upon the determination of the Cali-
fornia appeal, the court n1ight well have taken the Cali-
fornia proceedings into consideration in determining 
\Vhat should be done with the children in light of their 
welfare and best interests, but not having done so the 
matter is only partially tried as indicated by the fact 
that there is no finding as to what is for the best interests 
of the children and their welfare. The custody of the chil-
dren has been preserved in the father and the status 
quo maintained, and thus it becomes of substance that 
this Court reverse the order appealed from and remand 
the proceedings to the lower court for a determination 
as to what n1ust be done for the 'velfare and in the best 
interests of the children. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARD'S & MAT·TSSON 
and FRED I-I. EVANS 
Attorneys for Defendants a,nd 
A ppella.nts 
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